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REPORTING TREASURY STOCK AS AN ASSET: 
LAW, LOGIC, AND ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE 
Abstract; This paper traces development in the accounting literature, circa 1909-
1933, of, dominant support for contra-equity presentation of treasury stock, and re-
lates this overview to prominent current arguments for selective asset treatment. 
Classic "logical" objection to asset analysis is found to be compelling. Contem-
porary challenges to prevailing doctrine in terms of "economic substance," enjoy-
ing distinguished lineage from the earlier era, are recast as attractive recording 
and disclosure proposals. An auxiliary theme is the changing nature of relevant 
objection of "legalism." Sources include Hatfield, Esquerré, Montgomery, Paton, 
Kohler, and (of particular note) Sunley, and current analysts Allan Young and 
Beatrice Melcher. 
The recording of treasury stock transactions is a relatively flexible 
area, aside from any applicable legal requirements. There are alter-
native basic methods, the "par value" and "cost" approaches, each 
permitting varied treatment of pertinent "loss," in particular. In ac-
counting terms, however, neither gain nor loss may be recognized 
in reacquisition, reissuance, or retirement of stock.1 
The corresponding reporting doctrine is that treasury stock is a 
negative "equity" item, not an "asset." For fully half a century this 
position has enjoyed overwhelming support among accounting 
writers; in slightly qualified form it has since 1934 had "authorita-
tive" professional endorsement;a and, reinforced by SEC provisions 
Beyond the specific reference in note c, indebtedness is gratefully acknowledged 
to the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions. 
An earlier version of this paper, entitled "An Historical Perspective on Asset Pre-
sentation of Treasury Stock," was presented at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the 
American Accounting Association—Northeast Region. 
aThe reference is to a 1934 AI(CP)A statement, still accepted as authoritative, 
which allows that "it is perhaps in some circumstances permissible to show stock 
of a corporation held in its own treasury as an asset, if adequately disclosed" 
(emphasis added). Without qualification, the Committee on Accounting Procedure 
in 1938 rejected both recognition of gain or loss on treasury stock transactions, 
and direct adjustment of retained earnings in lieu of gain recognition. Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, pp. 9 (citation), 10 (Accounting Research Bulletin 43, 
Chapter 1, Sections A, paragraph 4, and B). 
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and (since 1954) federal income tax law, it has for nearly as long 
prevailed decisively in practice.2 During the years 1974-78 only 1.9% 
of companies surveyed by Accounting Trends and Techniques 
which held their own stock (as did 72.1% of all firms covered) 
carried such holdings as assets, or at least noncurrent ones.3 
Within the past generation, however, treasury stock activity has 
changed markedly in nature and increased immensely in volume. In 
this context it has been argued that "economic substance," as 
opposed to "legal form," can sometimes be expressed only through 
asset treatment. One prominent analyst favors such presentation 
whenever reissuance of stock is clearly "intended" at the time of 
acquisition, while another one is more restrictive. 
These challenges to accounting orthodoxy invite review of emer-
gence over the first third of this century of the prevailing consensus 
among accounting writers. Besides development of a consensus 
position, two points warrant particular notice: original "legalistic" 
argument for uniform asset presentation of treasury stock; and 
assertion or anticipation by early authorities of a leading inter-
mediate position taken today. Principal sources include Hatfield, 
Esquerré, Montgomery, Paton, and Kohler. The less celebrated 
author William T. Sunley, however, most incisively stated the case 
against asset presentation. 
Confining attention to treasury "common" stock, his argument is 
found to express a compelling "logical" point which presupposes 
no distinctive economic context, beyond incorporation itself, and 
hence poses no obstacle to economic "realism." Even so, useful 
contributions are credited to current selective asset advocates 
Allan Young, a finance professor, and Beatrice Melcher, a research 
associate of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), by recasting their respective positions as specific recording 
and disclosure proposals. 
Establishment of Treasury Stock Orthodoxy, Circa 1909-1933 
Early in this century treasury stock was normally carried as an 
asset, and as late as 1932 nearly one-half of relevant companies 
listed by the New York Stock Exchange followed this practice.4 By 
then, there was strong consensus in the accounting literature that 
asset presentation is unsound in principle. A sophisticated minority 
viewpoint called for such treatment in certain instances. 
Following identification of the two basic sources of reacquisition, 
and relevant objectives, emergence of the consensus position is 
documented, and argument for selective asset treatment is traced 
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back to 1909. Finally, a concise summation from 1933 invites clarifi-
cation of the prevailing analysis relative to the "entity" theory of 
financial reporting. 
Sources of Reacquisition, and Relevant Objectives 
The basic sources of stock reacquisition, discussed in terms of 
pertinent objectives of the earlier period, are (1) donation by share-
holders, and (2) purchase therefrom. Forfeiture sale upon subscriber 
default, a potential third source at the time given (contrary to 
present practice) prior stock certificate issuance,5 is disregarded due 
to relative unimportance. 
Donation 
Donation, a particularly prominent source of share reacquisition 
in the earlier era, may serve either of two main purposes: (a) elimi-
nation of a deficit, or (b) generation of working capital. 
Elimination of a Deficit 
Capital stock may be donated for purposes of eliminating a 
deficit, as a condition of dividend payment. Such donation would 
today require formal retirement of the stock, as a basis for record-
ing "additional paid-in capital" against which the deficit could be 
written off.6 Early practice, however, sanctioned immediate recog-
nition of "donated capital," at the par value of the shares.7 The stock 
could then be held in the treasury for other purposes, including the 
raising of working capital. 
Generation of Working Capital 
The objective of raising working capital is uniquely significant 
and controversial, historically. Focus is placed upon donation sub-
sequent to incorporation through exchange of stock wholly or princi-
pally for nonmonetary assets, such as patents, plant facilities, or 
mineral properties. These assets would be stated at the par value 
of the stock, rendering it "fully paid." Shareholders would then on 
a pro rata basis donate shares to the firm, possibly representing up 
to one-half their holdings. 
The stock could then be reissued for cash at less than par, with-
out imposing a contingent liability (to creditors) upon shareholders. 
A major obstacle to attraction of investment by an untested enter-
prise would thus be removed. 
3
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Early writers sometimes noted that inability to attract working 
capital at par value would not in itself imply overvaluation of initial 
assets. Original owners legitimately having strong faith in a new 
company might recognize need by other potential investors for 
special inducements.8 
Nonetheless, the writers did not doubt prevalence of the "treasury 
stock subterfuge," by which the nonmonetary properties were 
clearly overvalued to avert contingent liability on sale of stock at a 
discount. Relevant court protection for creditors was often at best 
problematic.9 Concern about this abuse may well have encouraged 
ready endorsement of contra-equity treatment of treasury stock, 
as well as advent of no-par (and low-par-value) stock. 
Purchase 
A prominent textbook of 1931b listed eight objectives of common 
stock "repurchase" (to use later terminology): 
1. Relieving a retiring stockholder of his interest in a close corpo-
ration 
2. Replacing a retiring stockholder in such a firm 
3. Accommodating a stockholder 
4. Eliminating a "dissident" stockholder 
5. Securing shares for distribution to employees 
6. Investing surplus funds 
7. Taking advantage of an expected rise in market value 
8. Simply reducing outstanding stock.10 
This listing seems particularly relevant to "close" corporations. 
Items 1 and 2 are defined in terms of such companies, while num-
bers 3 and 4 are apt to be particularly asociated with them. Objec-
tives 5 and 7 relate wholly or primarily to "public" firms. 
More direct evidence that reacquisition through purchase was 
not prevalent among publicly held corporations in the earlier era 
is provided by a contemporary study identifying 1932 as a year 
of unusually heavy treasury activity. In that year twenty-six com-
panies listed on the New York Exchange repurchased shares (aver-
bThrough national balloting among both academic and practicing accountants, 
Sunley and Pinkerton's text was nominated for Beta Alpha Psi's "Most Notable 
Contribution to the Accounting Literature Award" for the twelve months ended 
May 1, 1931. Also nominated, among twenty-five books listed, were works by 
Roy Kester; A. H. Church, a noted cost accounting writer; historian Wilmer Green; 
and W. B. Castenholz, like Sunley a prominent accounting author, practitioner, and 
correspondence educator. The award ultimately went to Castenholz's book. Shel-
dahl, pp. 480-495. 
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aging approximately five percent of total stock outstanding), com-
pared with eight in 1931 and six in 1933. The study concluded that 
"investment," in a sense embracing items 6 and 7 together, was 
the primary motive of such activity.11 
These references tend to support a critic's assertion that when 
the orthodox reporting doctrine arose reacquisition was generally 
insignificant to ongoing corporate financial planning.12 Centrality 
of "defensive" considerations in an era of severe depression must, 
however, be acknowledged. 
"Legalistic" Arguments for Asset Treatment 
Given the widespread early practice of carrying debit and credit 
items, as such, respectively on the asset and equity sides of the 
balance sheet,13 it is not surprising that treasury stock initially 
was widely reported as an asset. Prominent authorities supported 
such practice on two narrowly "legalistic" grounds, the second 
of which calls to mind the virtual prohibition of treasury holdings 
in Great Britain. 
Establishment of Monetary Value 
Harry C. Bentley, in 1911, and Robert H. Montgomery, in 1912 and 
1916, advocated asset presentation because stock repurchase, like 
purchase in general, establishes a "monetary value." Consideration 
rendered reflects value acquired.14 Presumably interpreting do-
nation through analogy, these authors viewed treasury stock as a 
"commodity, to be held or sold according to the wishes of man-
agement."15 
While in essence it merely notes that reacquisition is normally a 
market transaction involving outflow of funds, this argument is 
important historically as the original rationale for recording 
treasury stock at cost. 
Maintenance of Legal Capital, and a 
Related Reference to British Law 
Writing in 1914, Paul-Joseph Esquerré supported asset treatment 
because under governing, laws reacquisition generally did not re-
duce "legal capital."16 Basically, the par or stated value of re-
acquired stock was assumed to represent continuing capitalization 
in accounting terms. A like position perhaps lay behind the state-
ment of a 1922 corporate law text that "with some logical correct-
ness" reacquired "full-paid stock" would be reported as an asset.17 
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This legalistic argument conflicts with the first one, by implying 
that treasury stock should be recorded at par or stated value (as 
holdings thereafter reported as assets often were at the time18). 
It is no more persuasive logically, in its invitation to extreme rela-
tivism through statutory variation. However, Esquerré's position 
draws attention to a most basic objective of legal regulation in the 
area, and, in turn, traditional prohibition of treasury stock in 
Britain.c 
State laws by which reacquisition without retirement leaves legal 
capital intact serve to protect creditors, and shareholders them-
selves, from excessive distribution of funds. Confining repurchase 
to the amount of retained earnings, or retained earnings and "addi-
tional paid-in capital," they effect a trade-off between such action 
and dividend payout. Related protection is provided by statutory 
regulation of legitimate reacquisition purposes and, in individual 
cases, bond covenant restrictions in the area.19 
In British law concern for possible (1) harm to creditors, (2) 
manipulation of stock prices by companies "trafficking" in their 
own shares, and (3) abuse of any formal voting rights which might 
be recognized led very early to outright prohibition of treasury 
stock.20 The principle that a company cannot be its own share-
holder was established in 1887, in the case Trevor v. Whitworth, 
and later made statutory. It was relaxed negligibly by the Com-
panies Act of 1948, providing in specified cases for court-ordered 
share reacquisition from "oppressed" stockholders (in a clause 
repealed in 1980), and also forfeiture by defaulting subscribers 
without court involvement; and otherwise stipulating strict con-
ditions for reduction in capital under court supervision.21 
British corporate law also forbids a company to finance ac-
quisition of its shares by another party, in any measure, or, if con-
trolled by another company, to acquire an interest in that firm. The 
very restrictive overall policy is compromised somewhat, however, 
by provision for acquisition of a company's stock, or that of its 
parent, by trustees or other "nominees."22 Also, a subsidiary having 
obtained an interest in another corporation before takeover by that 
firm may apparently retain it, although one authoritative source 
recommends divestiture or arrangement for stock cancellation.23 
British accounting treatments have not been investigated in the 
present research. However, a subsidiary holding shares in its 
cGratitude is expressed to the anonymous reviewer who suggested making 
reference at this point to British law. It may be noted further that the European 
Economic Community has adopted stringent regulations concerning share reacqui-
sition within member countries. Schmitthoff, vol. 3, secs. L-633—L-639. 
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parent company would presumably report them as an asset, al-
though voting rights might be highly problematic. More pertinently, 
within the (hostile) British legal environment it would be particu-
larly meaningful in consolidated statements to report such holdings 
as treasury stock, analyzed as an equity deduction item. This 
"treasury stock method" enjoys considerable support in the United 
States.24 
Fleeting Influence of Legalism 
The influence of early legalistic cases for asset presentation was 
short-lived. Montgomery himself would soon advocate selective 
asset presentation, while more generally support for uniform contra-
equity treatment was becoming well entrenched. 
In part such developments simply reflected an expanding so-
phistication in accounting thought, including assertion for account-
ing of greater autonomy from the legal realm. Additionally, legalistic 
arguments could only seem particularly unpersuasive in the light of 
the troublesome area of donation. While one writer suggested that 
donated stock might be listed at zero valuation, at the foot of the 
asset section,25 it was commonly assumed that donation had im-
mediate accounting effect. Under asset treatment, the result could 
only be to increase total asset valuation over a level perhaps already 
highly inflated. Reissuance at a discount would then paradoxically 
decrease total valuation. 
Legalistic advocacy of asset treatment for treasury stock was 
promptly eclipsed by the basic argument for contra-equity presen-
tation, ironically itself considered legalistic by present critics of 
conventional analysis. 
The Classic Logical Case Against Asset 
Presentation, and Supporting Arguments 
The classic logical case against asset presentation, that the idea 
of "self-ownership" by a corporation has no content, was advanced 
by William T. Sunley in 1915. Several of his contemporaries added 
useful supporting points. 
Sunley's Classic Statement 
Sunley asserted simply that the "corporate" shareholder could 
in no meaningful sense possess three capacities or rights funda-
mental to corporate ownership. They are participation in (a) election 
of the board of directors, (b) distribution of periodic dividends, and 
(c) distribution of assets in liquidation. Formal participation in these 
7
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areas by the company itself would in substance be proportionate 
assignment to holders of outstanding stock of additional votes, 
dividends, or assets.26 
This point is self-evident relative to liquidating distribution. 
Further, while sometimes legally permitted in the earlier era, through 
transfer from retained earnings to dividend income,27 formal partici-
pation in dividends clearly would have no content. Moreover, the 
argument is equally strong as to voting rights. Proportionate repre-
sentation of either operating management or the sitting corporate 
directorate would contradict their basic rationale, while any other 
approach would be fully as arbitrary as designation of recipients of 
the "corporate" share upon liquidation. 
Sunley could easily have extended his argument to the "pre-
emptive right," a characteristic feature of ownership in his time. 
A corporation could not meaningfully exercise "rights" relative to 
itself. Any pretense in that regard could only imply their proportional 
increase for holders of stock still outstanding, or exclusion from 
issuance of the relevant percentage of shares. 
Almost the only ownership entitlement available to the "corpo-
rate" shareholders is transfer of reacquired shares to other parties 
for value, and even it involves special legal restriction.28 
Supporting References 
It is useful to note selected supporting points, or statements, 
made in the earlier period for contra-equity analysis of treasury 
stock. In 1909 Henry Rand Hatfield stated that "In a certain sense 
any return of capital stock to the issuing company may be con-
sidered as a virtual cancellation of that amount of the previously 
issued stock,"29 without yet (as noted below) accepting the apparent 
reporting implications of this interpretation. Some years later, how-
ever, in essentially a revised edition of the 1909 text, Hatfield would 
endorse uniform contra-equity treatment.30 
Also writing before Sunley, Arthur Lowes Dickinson stated that 
capital stock "represents the manner in which its property and 
assets are distributed among those who constitute the corporation," 
and continued as follows: 
If one of those owners disposes of his shares to the corpo-
ration, he withdraws therefrom, taking with him what he 
Considers his fair proportion of the asset value, and leaving 
the rest to be divided among the remaining owners.31 
William A. Paton, just beginning his career, likewise insisted upon 
contra-equity treatment. Responding to the objection that "fully 
8
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paid" treasury stock would tend to be more marketable than un-
issued shares, he remarked that this difference no more warranted 
asset presentation than would the value to a bank of its right to 
issue currency justify recognition of a pertinent asset. He further 
advanced two "reductio ad absurdum" arguments effective against 
undiscriminating recognition of treasury stock as an asset: first, 
that formal retirement of shares could not intelligibly be interpreted 
as asset destruction; and second, that asset treatment implies that 
a firm could reacquire virtually all its stock outstanding without 
contracting its capital base.32 
Other prominent proponents of contra-equity analysis included 
Hastings Lyon, Roy Kester, and R. J. Bennett and Paul Pinkerton 
(although, as noted presently, Pinkerton took another position in a 
subsequent collaboration).33 
Early Argument for "Selective" Asset Presentation 
In 1909 Hatfield introduced argument for "selective" asset presen-
tation, despite the reference just made to his early thought, by 
suggesting that management purposes should govern reporting of 
reacquired stock: 
If it [reacquisition] is done with the intention of reducing 
the Capital Stock, certainly the stock . . . should be 
deducted from the amount of the outstanding stock . . . . 
But if the stock is not acquired with the intent of reducing 
the capitalization, and is not canceled, accounting practice 
in this country certainly justifies and, indeed, requires 
that it be shown among the assets.34 
Only stock reacquired with retirement intent would on this ap-
proach be reported as a deduction item. Like his early successors 
in the tradition he initiated, Hatfield expressed only implicitly the 
basic premise of his position: that in certain cases reacquisition 
can reduce capital only in form, not substance. 
Montgomery refined the analysis in the 1920s, in the third (1921) 
and fourth (1927) editions of the auditing text in which he had 
earlier advanced his form of legalism.35 His new position was stated 
most clearly, however, in a 1923 abridgement prepared with the aid 
of one of his partners. 
Montgomery asserted that stock "purchased for resale" (or, 
clearly other reissuance) should be reported as an asset at cost,d 
d|n his fourth edition Montgomery expressly favored reduction to "market" given 
a price decline regarded as permanent. Montgomery, 1927, p. 245. 
9
Sheldahl: Reporting treasury stock as an asset: Law, logic, and economic substance
Published by eGrove, 1982
10 The Accounting Historians Journal, Fall, 1982 
while shares reacquired "without specific intention to resell" should 
be presented "as a deduction from the capital stock issued," at 
par.36 Due to pertinent abuse, however, he called for presentation 
of donated shares as equity deduction items, at par, balanced by 
reduction of relevant nonmonetary asset items.37 
Montgomery's approach differs from Hatfield's 1909 position pri-
marily in analyzing reacquisition without clear intention in either 
direction, retirement or reissuance, as a decrease in capital. A 
secondary difference is that Hatfield had made no special provision 
for donation, perhaps because conspicuous abuse in the area did 
not yet exist. 
Montgomery's position on repurchase (at least) drew support in 
1931 from a most unlikely source: Sunley himself, in collaboration 
with Pinkerton, another early advocate of contra-equity analysis.e 
Referring to their listing of basic reacquisition objectives, Sunley 
and Pinkerton observed that, while only speculation and employee 
distribution entail reissuance intent, only reduction in capital ex-
cludes it. Varied contextual features, including evidence of estab-
ished company policy, might indicate such intent. Even reacquisition 
to accommodate a stockholder or eliminate a dissident would war-
rant asset treatment if a buyer were secured in advance.38 
While Hatfield wrote in 1927 that "accounting practice occasion-
ally" followed Montgomery's approach to selective asset treat-
ment,39 no explicit commentary on it has been found. The closest 
implicit reply was Paton's negative reference to "marketability" of 
treasury shares as a basis for asset analysis. 
The most direct rebuttal, however, is that a purpose requiring 
ultimate maintenance of capital might be sought through a strategy 
involving temporary contraction. Another potentially telling objec-
tion is that the position is unworkable, because "intention" may 
manipulatively be disguised. These points are of particular interest 
in that Montgomery's position has of late been revived, as discussed 
below. 
Kohler's Summation: Treasury Stock 
Orthodoxy and the Entity Theory 
With no more than minor overstatement, Eric Kohler in 1933 
characterized accounting texts of the time as "well-nigh unanimous" 
eSunley reverted to his original position in the revised edition of his text, in-
volving a different coauthor. Sunley and Carter, pp. 90-91. 
10
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in supporting contra-equity analysis of treasury stock. He regarded 
this position as "unassailable," if the corporation were genuinely 
a "separate organism."40 
This reference relates the consensus viewpoint to the "entity" 
theory of the corporation. Its essence is simply that a corporation 
cannot intelligibly be regarded as a partial owner of itself. On a 
"proprietorship" outlook, by comparison, the full shareholder group 
might be viewed as collective owner of treasury holdings, hardly a 
clearer interpretation. 
Kohler's interpretation may prompt a contemporary objection of 
"legalism" against treasury stock orthodoxy, but only misguidedly. 
First, any meaningful analysis must presuppose the basic concepts 
of property ownership and corporate structure. 
Second, it is not assumed that corporations are "real" entities, 
on the order of observable physical objects. Effort is invited to 
"pierce the corporate veil," by way of reconstructing Sunley's 1915 
argument in terms of one or more standard logical fallacies, such 
as circularity or infinite regression. The following argument, formu-
lated as if treasury stock were an asset, might serve as a first 
approximation: 
1. Ownership of common stock constitutes "indirect" partial 
ownership of an evolving body of financial resources, con-
strained in their management by an evolving body of financial 
obligations 
2. Ownership of common stock in a company whose resources 
include treasury common stock constitutes "indirect" partial 
ownership of that item itself, among the other resources 
3. The treasury stock itself represents "indirect"' partial owner-
ship of the body of resources within which it is included 
4. Hence, ownership of common stock in a company whose re-
sources include treasury common stock constitutes "indirect" 
partial ownership of that item (among the other holdings), 
which in turn constitutes "indirect" partial ownership of that 
item (among other holdings), . . . , and so on, ad infinitum. 
While adequate clarification of "indirect" ownership would be 
a challenging task, it should be possible to restate the case against 
asset presentation in line with analysis of the corporation as a "legal 
fiction." Before submitting final judgment, however, current argu-
ment for selective asset treatment must be considered. 
11
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Contemporary Heterodoxy, in Two Formulations 
While it has prevailed decisively at the levels of both theory and 
practice, uniform contra-equity analysis has recently been chal-
lenged by Allan Young and Beatrice Melcher. They have in turn 
revived Montgomery's position, and taken a less subjective ap-
proach to selective asset treatment, representing only modest ad-
vance in sophistication. 
The new "heterodoxy" is very noteworthy, however, in view 
of qualitative and quantitative changes having greatly enhanced 
significance of treasury stock activity. In the early era stock re-
purchase was relatively rare, and usually required contra-equity 
presentation in any case. Today, in significant quantities, it is com-
monplace, and purposes viewed by current critics as requiring asset 
treatment have gained prominence. 
Changes in Scope and Objectives 
of Treasury Stock Activity 
Share reacquisition, by purchase, has expanded remarkably 
during the past generation. From 1954 to 1969 annual repurchase 
by companies listed on the New York Exchange increased from 5.8 
million to 64.0 million shares, representing respectively 1.02%f and 
2.02% of total shares traded. After a brief period of decline it rose 
abruptly to 143.8 million shares, or 3.32% of overall trading, in 1973. 
In that "bear-market" year 219 companies, approximately one-
seventh of the listed corporations, reacquired at least one hundred 
thousand common shares.41 
A survey conducted among the chief financial executives of those 
companies identified the following objectives, in the order listed, as 
having been the most prevalent bases for reacquisition: 
1. Obtaining shares for executive stock options, other incentive 
compensation programs, and employee stock purchase plans 
2. Obtaining shares for corporate acquisition (business combi-
nation) programs 
3. Improving earnings per shareg 
4. Obtaining shares for conversions of bonds or preferred stock 
5. Temporarily investing surplus cash 
fThis first figure (only) is biased upward, by exclusion from the base of shares 
traded prior to stock dividends or stock splits, although the reduction is offset in 
part by inclusion of preferred shares. "New York Stock Exchange Stocks," p. 28. 
gThe SEC in 1979 adopted a requirement by which registrants must disclose 
impact of stock repurchase upon earnings per share. Beresford and Neary, p. 6. 
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6. Supporting the market price of common stock 
7. Increasing the debt/equity ratio.42 
This listing is not fully comparable to the one cited for the earlier 
period, which was nonranked in form, basically impressionistic, and 
scarcely confined to public corporations. Even so, the lists imply 
that reacquisition was generally much less significant to overall 
financial planning in the earlier period. Only two of the eight early 
objectives appear in the current list, namely, obtaining shares for 
distribution to employees, and investing surplus funds.h Further, the 
former one is immensely more important in the present day. 
Against this background, Young and Melcher have called for re-
examination of the traditional reporting doctrine. 
Young's Revival of Montgomery's Analysis 
Young takes the position represented by Montgomery in the 
1920s, omitting, as had Sunley and Pinkerton, reference to donation. 
Characterizing assets as "uses of funds which still retain a service 
potential to the firm,"43 he would so present all shares repurchased 
with clear "intention" of reissuance, for any recognizable manage-
ment purpose.44 Formal commitment to reissuance is considered un-
necessary. Valuation would be at cost or the lower of cost or market, 
depending upon whether classification were "noncurrent" or (in-
admissibly for Montgomery) "current."45 
In support of this position, three contexts are cited in which man-
agement purposes are commonly accepted as central to account-
ing analysis: distinction between current and noncurrent assets; 
operating and financial leases; and stock dividends and stock 
splits.46 In the latter two instances the alternative would be strict 
control by legal form. 
Terminologically, it would be preferable to speak of "expectation" 
of reissuance as the condition for asset treatment, since initiative 
may rest with parties other than management, as in conversion of 
other securities to common stock. Substantively, Young's criterion 
invites the objection of undue subjectivity, and encouragement 
thereby of accounting manipulation by management. 
The latter objection arises from the direct implication, largely 
ignored by Young, that reissuance may yield "gain" or "loss." While 
speculative purposes may give pause in this regard, linkage of re-
hTwo of the other objectives cited in the prior listing, numbers 6 and 8, were 
cited by the contemporary financial executives surveyed, but by fewer than 10 of 
the 113 respondents in each case. Walsh, p. 6. 
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acquisition with the earnings process seems generally implausible. 
For example, the standard criticism of accounting for conversion 
of bonds at market price of either security is provision of such 
treatment for gain or loss.47 Such objection can hardly be dismissed 
out of hand. 
There is risk of severe paradox in Young's position, in any case, 
For example, if "economic substance" is to govern accounting 
treatment of reacquired stock, should not unissued shares be carried 
as an asset if they are to be placed on the market in lieu of reissu-
ance of treasury holdings? Since "gain" on reissuance was taxable 
for two decades, 1934-54,48 this case historically is realistic. 
Melcher's Case for Narrower Asset Treatment 
Melcher's relatively complex approach yields much narrower 
advocacy of asset presentation. She would require both that (1) 
reacquisition serve on explicit requirement that the company ac-
quire its own shares, and (2) the specified purpose be of an "oper-
ating" nature rather than a "financing" one.49 More concisely, 
treasury stock should be reported as an asset if it is acquired rela-
tive to an express commitment, to serve particular operating objec-
tives. Donated stock would almost as such fail the test. 
"Operating" objectives are illustrated mainly in terms of com-
pensation plans, notably stock option and purchase programs, 
profit-sharing and bonus provisions, and deferred compensation 
contracts. Treasury shares may also be used for pension plan costs, 
sales commissions, and charitable donations.50 
Stock reacquisition for "financing" purposes directly concerns 
equity interests. Objectives include (a) investment of excess funds, 
(b) revision in financing sources, (c) anticipation of conversions and 
exercise of warrants, (d) distribution of stock dividends, and (e) 
implementation of business combinations. Melcher disallows asset 
treatment in such cases on the premise that change in ownership 
interests alone cannot yield gain or loss.51 
Melcher advocates asset treatment, and attendant recognition of 
gain or loss (as applicable), for reacquisitions "specifically required 
for a designated operating purpose,"52 because "distributing stock 
to satisfy liabilities does not change the underlying nature and pur-
pose of incurring costs."53 Since only action by the board of direc-
tors is specifically cited, it is perhaps assumed that contractual 
commitment to stock reacquisition would ordinarily require prior 
board approval. 
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Such limitation of asset treatment is no doubt intended to fore-
stall income manipulation through treasury stock activity. Shares ac-
quired prior to origination of a need for treasury shares would not 
qualify, nor would stock acquired with the idea of discretionary re-
issuance in fulfillment of a given obligation, in preference either to 
issuance of new shares, or to distribution of cash or marketable 
securities.54 
Unlike Young's, this position has some affinity with official author-
itative tradition. The cryptic 1934 AI(CP)A statement on treasury 
stock cited in note (a) contemplated that asset analysis might on 
occasion be "permissible," without citing instances. The SEC, how-
ever, has approved asset reporting of shares reacquired expressly 
for prompt use in employee bonus or stock purchase plans, for 
example,55 and otherwise orthodox analysts have tentatively ac-
cepted such treatment.i Melcher has gone further, endorsing man-
datory asset presentation in these cases. 
Overall, the distinction between two classes of objectives seems 
pertinent if treasury stock activity indeed relates to the earnings 
process. Further, the condition that reissuance be required would 
clearly support objectivity. At the same time, it seems a bit para-
doxical to recognize gain or loss on transactions relating to com-
pensation plans, but not ones involving reissuance of shares ac-
quired as an "investment." 
Broader appraisal of the views of Young and Melcher than 
has as yet been made awaits final evaluation of the basic case 
against asset treatment. 
Reaffirmation of Orthodoxy, Accommodating 
Dissident Analyses 
By way of conclusion, the classic argument against asset presen-
tation of treasury stock is reaffirmed, while means are identified for 
deriving substantial contributions nonetheless from both Young 
and Melcher. 
Unsuccessful Efforts to Refute 
Sunley's Classic Argument 
Sunley's contention that a corporation cannot be an owner of 
itself seems generally compelling, on its own terms. Proponents of 
asset treatment may still submit, however, that it mainly addresses 
iFinney and Miller, pp. 122-123. The authors cited themselves take a strictly 
orthodox reporting position, however. 
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features unimportant to modern share ownership, or that it sub-
ordinates basic objectives of financial reporting to empty logical 
abstractions. Failure of each rebuttal effort leaves such analysts 
only the bleak option of "heroic denial" that their positions do imply 
self-ownership. 
Analytical Approach: Alleged Conceptual Distortion 
The basic "analytical" response to Sunley's argument would be 
that the primary features of modern stock ownership are storage of 
value and eligibility for periodic dividends, and that they are respec-
tively ignored and approached misleadingly by the argument. 
Treasury stock could be viewed as conferring a counterpart to 
participation in cash or property dividends, through "saving" 
dividend payout. The other features considered by the classic 
argument, as discussed above, might be dismissed as follows: 
1. Voting privileges are generally a mere formality 
2. Emphasis upon participation in liquidating dividends conflicts 
with the "going concern" premise of accounting 
3. As indicated by declining incidence,56 preemptive rights are 
relatively insignificant in the present day. 
Allusion to storage of value recalls Paton's response to as-
sertion of asset status based on "marketability" of treasury shares, 
at a time in which they often were more attractive to investors than 
newly authorized stock. The references made to other features are 
equally misleading. Delay in issuance of new shares likewise 
"saves" dividend distributions. Further, voting is not a formality 
within close corporations, although they may for example reacquire 
shares with reissuance intent. Moreover, assesment of liquidation 
prospects may properly affect decisions on retention or acquisi-
tion of stock, and their residual equity interest is the prime con-
cern of a company's "final" shareholders. Finally, while the pre-
emptive right has declined in overall importance, it is hardly an 
irrelevant or incidental feature of common stock, where it exists. 
Methodological Approach: Alleged "Formalism" 
"Methodologically," a selective asset advocate may insist that 
a purely conceptual argument making no reference to management 
objectives, economic implications, or other behavioral bearings 
must not control accounting treatments. This objection of 
"formalism" is a contemporary allegation of accounting legalism. 
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While it is an accounting truism that ultimately substance must 
prevail over form, the classic argument for contra-equity analysis 
cannot be dismissed on this basis. Two relevant points have already 
been made: that substantive likenesses between treasury stock and 
unissued shares could in no event justify asset recognition in the 
latter case; and that management purposes not involving reduction 
in capital might be approached through temporary contraction. 
The decisive rebuttal, however, is that if there are relevant ma-
terial differences between different contexts of share reacquisition, 
it should be possible to represent them in accounting/reporting 
terms without inviting logical paradox. The remaining task is to 
illustrate this point relative to the positions of Young and Melcher, 
having concluded that the orthodox doctrine on treasury stock re-
porting is correct. 
Accommodation of the Heterodox Positions 
Three possible approaches remain for giving accounting recog-
nition to different contexts of stock reacquisition: (1) differential 
recording of transactions; (2) supplemental disclosure; and (3) a 
combination of courses 1 and 2. In an effort to salvage significant 
contributions from both critics of orthodox accounting treatment, 
the third alternative is adopted. Young's position is recast as a 
"recording" doctrine, while Melcher's variation is expressed at the 
"disclosure" level. 
Basic Treasury Stock Recording Methods: 
A Complementary Interpretation 
Practice has followed theory relative to presentation of treasury 
stock. However, accounting writers have predominantly favored the 
"par value" approach to recording of relevant transactions, while 
practice has generally favored the "cost" method. The two alter-
natives may be reconciled by recognizing them as suited to different 
contexts of stock reacquisition. 
Historical Divergence Between Theory and Practice 
In the earlier period a strong consensus developed in favor of the 
"par value" recording method, by which reacquisition is recorded 
essentially as retirement of stock, and reissuance as an independent 
transaction. Representative advocates of recording treasury stock 
at par or stated value included Paton, Kester, Hatfield, and Harry A. 
Finney.57 Apparently the "cost" method, by which treasury shares 
17
Sheldahl: Reporting treasury stock as an asset: Law, logic, and economic substance
Published by eGrove, 1982
18 The Accounting Historians Journal, Fall, 1982 
are recorded at cost and their reissuance is accounted for as a 
follow-up transaction, was associated too closely with the dis-
credited reporting doctrine of asset treatment to be attractive. 
The par value approach was endorsed in 1957 by the American 
Accounting Association Committee on Concepts and Standards,58 
and may yet today enjoy more support than the cost method among 
accounting writers. It was recently commended by Melcher, for 
nonasset contexts, and also by two parties linking the other record-
ing procedure to asset presentation of reacquired shares, Norlin 
Rueschhoff and textbook collaborators D. E. Kieso and J. J. Wey-
gandt.59 
Even so, the cost method has dominated practice. During the 
years 1974-78, 86.7% of surveyed companies which reported 
treasury stock in the equity section did so at cost, of which 97.1% 
treated it as a final deduction item.60 Classification by reacquisition 
context is, however, unavailable. 
Proposed Complementarity of the Methods 
It is submitted that recognition of the two recording methods as 
mutual competitors is misguided, and only forestalls effective 
response to advocates of selective asset presentation. A comple-
mentary interpretation advanced by Eldon Hendriksen,61 and in a 
modified form having official support as well,j is adopted instead. 
Specifically, the cost method should be used whenever reacquisi-
tion occurs with clear intention or expectation of reissuance, 
whether or not a formal requirement exists, and the par value 
method otherwise. In the latter case, "'constructive retirement" is 
assumed. 
The position taken parallels Young's approach to selective asset 
treatment, because the distinctive features of Melcher's analysis 
seem rather arbitrary outside such a context. First, since gain or 
loss would not be recognized in any case, the rationale for differ-
ential recording of reacquisition for "operating" and "financing" 
objectives is removed. Second, the strictures as to "requirement" 
of reacquisition presuppose opportunity, otherwise, for income 
manipulation, whereas any subjectivity within the dualistic approach 
adopted would affect presentation only of the equity accounts 
themselves. Any incentive provided in this context to manipulate 
jln paragraph 12b of Opinion No. 6, the Accounting Principles Board recom-
mended use of a "cost" basis "When a corporation's stock is acquired for pur-
poses other than retirement (formal or constructive), or when ultimate disposition 
has not yet been decided." In the latter regard it differs from Hendriksen's posi-
tion, supported in this study. Financial Accounting Standards Board, p. 139. 
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reported accounting numbers, themselves, is assumed to be mini-
mal. 
To leave matters at this point, however, would invite concern as 
to undue subjectivity in reporting, relative to management purposes 
themselves. A relevant requirement of disclosure should thus ac-
company the dualistic doctrine governing recording of treasury 
stock activity. 
A Proposal as to Supplemental Disclosure 
It is suggested, then, that through supplemental disclosure dis-
tinction should be drawn between shares reacquired subject to 
formal "requirement" of reissuance, and other holdings recorded 
at cost. Inclusion of such information would not only accommodate 
Melcher's viewpoint, but also ease the burden upon the indepen-
dent auditor in attesting to the equity section of the balance sheet. 
While the appropriate level of detail is debatable, in the absence 
of relevant empirical study of reader needs, additional information 
regarding treasury stock holdings might be provided in this con-
nection. For example, a distinction could be drawn between "cur-
rent" and "noncurrent" items, based upon time frame of antici-
pated reissuance. Such a disclosure would capture still another 
dimension of Young's position. 
In summary, the area of supplemental disclosure is likely to be 
highly important in developing standards for treasury stock report-
ing. 
Concluding Comment 
The historical overview developed above has both recognized 
an enduring contribution on the part of early work relative to 
treasury stock reporting, and provided an invitation to contemporary 
research concerning specific recording and disclosure issues aris-
ing in the area. In particular, the force of the classic logical argu-
ment against asset presentation has been reaffirmed, without gen-
eral dismissal of the views of heterodox analysts, past or present. 
By sorting out the principal legal, logical, and economic issues 
whose interplay is involved, the study has identified treasury stock 
accounting as an area more intriguing than the volume of scholarly 
attention to date directed towards it might suggest. 
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